Are the Provincial Data Better than the National Ones?
National GDP should equal the sum of provincial GDP (provincial gross value added). But prior to the 2006 benchmark revision, the sum of provincial GDP routinely exceeded national GDP. This discrepancy increased continuously from 1996 to 2004. By 2004, the sum of provincial GDP was 19 per cent larger than the national value reported by the NBS (part B of Table 1 ). The national values are consistently lower than the sum provincial values in the secondary and tertiary sector.
The rising discrepancy coincided with a wave of reports on local data falsification from 1997 until 2001. In response, the NBS, with support of the State Council and the Disciplinary Commission of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, in 1997/98 started a campaign against local data falsification. The continuing discrepancy between the national data and the sum provincial data right up until 2004 would suggest that the campaign against the ''wind of falsification and embellishment'' was not successful.
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In 2004, the then NBS commissioner, Li Deshui (李德水), offered a mix of technical reasons and corrections of exaggerated data as explanation of the discrepancy: provinces use 1990 base year prices when calculating real growth, while the NBS makes adjustments to this procedure based on a price index (and starting in 2004 the NBS fully switched to a price index); provinces double-count cross-provincial economic activities; provinces still use (presumably questionable) report forms for industrial enterprises with annual sales revenue below 5 million yuan; provinces use the opportunity of the as yet incomplete measurement of tertiary sector activities to adjust tertiary sector output upward such that the sectoral data add up to their desired aggregate output value; and provinces have incentives to exaggerate output (due to growth targets, comparisons of different localities by their output growth rates and the use of statistics to measure local cadres' ''achievements''). 3 The benchmark revision national data suggest that the pre-economic census provincial GDP values were fairly close to target, contrary to Li Deshui's arguments in favour of the original national values over the provincial ones. If the 2004 economic census results are correct, provinces under-reported tertiary sector value added (where Li Deshui claimed over-reporting), had accurate data for the primary sector (agriculture), and over-reported in industry and especially 2 The issue of data falsification in the late 1990s is presented, among others, by Thomas G. Rawski, ''What is happening to China's GDP statistics, '' China Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2001) in the small sector construction. Overall, the sum of pre-economic census provincial GDP in 2004 was only 2.1 per cent larger than the revised national figure (part C of Table 1 ). The pre-economic census national data, on the other hand, turned out to be rather inaccurate. The revised nominal GDP figure for 2004 is 16.8 per cent higher than the originally published one (part D of Table 1 ). Most of this increase is due to an almost 50 per cent upward revision to national tertiary sector value added. The annual revisions to primary sector value added across all years (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) The GB2002 incorporates a number of innovations in comparison to the GB1994. For example, in the GB2002 ''logging and transport of timber and bamboo'' and ''preliminary processing of textile fibres'' move from industry into agriculture. In the agricultural sector, ''household sideline business'' is dissolved into the corresponding other (including industrial) sectors. The three main economic sectors thus are only approximately compatible between the GB1994 and the GB2002.
The national income accounts section of the Statistical Yearbook 2006, which incorporates the benchmark revision of 1993-2004 values, does not specify which classification system the data of the individual years follows. A note to the first table in the section (p. 57, note b) for two sub-sectors of the tertiary sector explicitly lists a number of reclassifications that start in 2005 only; these de facto correspond to the GB1994 to GB2002 transition. It also states that agricultural services are included with agriculture only after 2005. 7 The exclusion of agricultural services from agriculture violates both the GB1994 (as already previously known for the pre-economic census data) and the GB2002. If these two signals are indicative of all sectoral data, then they imply a statistical break in all sectoral value added between 2004 and 2005 due to the switch to the GB2002.
The revisions to primary sector nominal value added of 1993-2004 would then still need to be explained. The coverage of economic activities in the economic census was expanded to include, first, economic activities previously ignored, such as those occurring in subordinate units outside the main business of an enterprise, and second, economic activities captured through statistical compilations outside the economic census (and previously not included in GDP), such as home-owners renting out housing, home teaching or childcare services. The NBS also used the opportunity of the benchmark revision following the economic census to introduce various innovations, including the allocation of interest on household savings deposits to the sector that produced the particular value added. 
Spurious Real Growth Rates
The 2006 benchmark revision changed the real growth rates of tertiary sector value added and of GDP, but not those of the primary and secondary sectors. That is not plausible, and in one respect outright erroneous.
Primary and secondary sector real growth rates 1993-2004
The post-economic census adjustments to primary sector nominal value added increased the previously published value of 1993 by only 0.1 per cent, but that of 2004 by 0.9 per cent (with a continuous increase in the years in between, see part D of Table 1 ). That is, the value of newly added agricultural activities between 1993 and 2004 increases significantly faster than the value of original agricultural activities, and if the newly added activities were subject to a similar deflator as the original ones, the resulting new real growth rate of total agricultural activities should go up. What the NBS has done, instead, by not changing the real growth rates, is to impose an upward revision on the implicit deflator. (The NBS publishes nominal values and real growth rates; these together imply a particular deflator.) One could believe a constant real growth rate series if the 1993 nominal primary sector value had been revised by the same percentage as the 2004 primary sector value, but that is not what the statistics show.
Compared to the primary sector, the revisions to 2004 value added in the secondary sector are much larger (+3.8 per cent for industry, 29.2 per cent for construction). But the pattern of change over time is similar to the primary sector in that the revisions to the 1993 values are also significantly smaller (+0.3 per cent, 20.8 per cent) than those to the 2004 values. That is, the two secondary sector sub-sectors have experienced changes in nominal output that differ significantly from the pattern inherent in the previously published data, and one would expect the real growth rates to change correspondingly, but those have remained unchanged. The implication of not changing real growth rates is that the NBS raised the implicit deflator of industry, and lowered that of construction.
There are two possible interpretations of this pattern. First, the NBS used the opportunity of the 2006 benchmark revision in agriculture, industry and construction to switch to a new deflator. The census was about year 2004 nominal secondary and tertiary sector data, in particular output data, and not about the collection of comprehensive price data for 1993-2004 across all three sectors. The new deflators would thus have to come from some other source. But where should such new deflators come from? Why should they cover only the period 1993-2004 and not 1978-92? 10 And why should they be of exactly that size which keeps the real growth rates of all years unchanged and thus causes a 1:1 change in nominal values, when the economic census was about collecting new nominal output data for industry and construction (and the tertiary sector), and new data was, according to Xu Xianchun of the NBS, indeed collected? 11 This scenario is not plausible.
A second possible interpretation is that the implicit deflators are not changed. Then either the revised 1993-2004 nominal values or the unchanged real growth rates (or both) must be incorrect. To take the case of industry, the 2004 economic census resulted in an increase of 2004 nominal value added of industry by 3.8 per cent, and no change in the 1992 value.
Suppose that all the 2004 adjustment was due solely to reallocations among sectors. Then the reduction in reallocations to zero in 1992 is not plausible. It is more likely that the reallocation should occur in roughly the same proportion in each year. Reducing the revisions to zero in 1992 would simply be a matter of convenience. The implication would be that the earlier in the reform period, the (unnecessarily) less accurate are sectoral value added data.
Alternatively, suppose that all the 2004 adjustment was due to an expanded coverage of economic activities in the economic census. The revised data of 2004 then may simply reflect the inability of the NBS in recent years to capture the proliferation of economic activities. But in that case, real growth rates should have been revised, which they were not.
Inconsistent calculation of secondary sector real growth rates 1993-2004
The fact that the NBS retained the pre-economic census secondary sector real growth rates implies an inconsistency. The secondary sector real growth rate is a weighted average of the real growth rates of industry and construction, with as weights the shares of industry and construction in secondary sector nominal value added. Retaining the pre-economic census secondary sector real growth rates implies that the NBS did not change the weights of industry and construction in the calculation of secondary sector real growth rates. This is despite the increase in nominal value added of industry and the decrease in nominal value added of construction, and even though these changes are sufficiently large at least in some years to change the real growth rate of the secondary sector, calculated with one decimal and using a Tö rnqvist index or previous-year weights. This appears an outright mistake.
It is not an outright mistake only if the NBS uses pre-1993 nominal weights to aggregate sectoral real growth rates. However, that would amount to gross misspecification because inappropriate weights would be applied to sectoral growth rates. It would also mark a severe deviation from earlier practice in that the official pre-economic census GDP real growth rates are best matched by applying previous-year weights to sectoral real growth rates or by using a Tö rnqvist index.
Tertiary sector real growth rates 1978-2004
In the tertiary sector, economic census results led to upward revisions to both the nominal values and the real growth rates of 1993-2004. There is thus no issue of unrevised real growth rates.
The revisions to tertiary sector data extended further, to the nominal values of 1978-1992. 12 Perhaps these revisions reflect an expansion of the coverage of economic activities, limited to the tertiary sector. 13 The corresponding real growth rates remained unchanged, implying changes to the implicit tertiary sector value added deflator of these years. Because the proportion of the change to tertiary sector value added is similar in 1978 and 1992, with 2.5 per cent and 3.1 per cent upward revisions, retaining the old real growth rates appears a simplifying assumption with limited consequences.
Impact on GDP 1993-2004
In the years 1993-2004, with only the tertiary sector real growth rates allowed to increase, the overall effect on real GDP growth is smaller than the increase in nominal 2004 GDP of 16.8 per cent over the original figure would suggest. The original average annual real growth rate between 1992 and 2004 is 9.4 per cent and the revised one is 9.9 per cent. 14 (See Table 2 for the annual real growth rates.) However, a ''mixed'' real growth rate that combines the revised sectoral nominal data with the deflators implicit in the pre-economic census data, using a Tö rnqvist index of real GDP growth, is 10.7 per cent. 15 In other words, the official post-economic census real GDP growth rate was revised upward by 0.5 percentage points per year, but should in all likelihood have been revised upward by 1.3 percentage points.
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Creating Havoc across a Wide Range of Statistical Data
In the expenditure approach to the calculation of GDP, which is not the official approach to calculating GDP in China, the NBS chose to revise all nominal values back to 1978. In comparison to the (official) production approach posteconomic census value of GDP (discussed above), the revised expenditure approach value is 1.1 per cent lower in 1978, and 2.4 and 2.3 per cent higher in 1992 and 2004. In the expenditure approach, real growth rates (and thus implicit deflators) are not available except for per capita household consumption.
13 Another possible explanation of the revisions to 1978-92 tertiary sector value added which, due to its length, is not provided here is based on the fact that the previous benchmark revision following the 1993 tertiary sector census failed to incorporate revised data for Guangdong province. 14 Statistical Yearbook 2005, p. 54, and Statistical Yearbook 2006, p. 60. Harry X. Wu, in a paper that I came across after submission of this article, examines in greater detail the official retrospective adjustment method to nominal value added (and GDP); he is particularly interested in the fact that the 1998 real GDP growth rate is the only one that has not been adjusted ( Table 3 reports the revisions to nominal data. Expenditure approach GDP in 2004 was revised upward by 12.6 per cent. This comprises, first, a 15.4 per cent upward revision to final consumption, which in turn reflects an 8.2 per cent upward revision to household consumption and a 41.1 per cent upward revision to government consumption. Within household consumption, rural consumption was revised downward by 26.6 per cent and urban consumption upward by 31.9 per cent. Second, gross capital formation was revised upward by 10.0 per cent, which in turn reflects a 4.4 per cent upward revision to gross fixed capital formation and a 673.2 per cent upward revision to inventory investment.
The accuracy of the expenditure approach has been questioned before: calculating expenditure approach household consumption in accordance with the NBS explanations on how the NBS does it, one is unable to replicate the NBS's results. 17 The 2006 benchmark revision confirms the earlier suspicions.
The opposing revisions to rural versus urban nominal consumption reflect, first, a redefinition of who is ''rural'' as opposed to ''urban'' as well as, second, changes to the real growth rates. Figure 1 shows how the (unchanged) total population is newly split into rural versus urban for all years since 1978 with the relabelling of a large share of the ''rural'' as ''urban'' population in the most recent years; the urban citizen consumes more than the rural one, and thus 18 Per capita real growth rates were revised slightly in all years , rising from an average annual 7.03 per cent to 7.35 per cent for the total population, falling from 6.24 per cent to 5.71 per cent for the rural population, and falling from 6.28 per cent to 6.18 for the urban population. The implicit deflators are unchanged. The revisions to government consumption are very large and one may wonder where the 41.1 per cent upward revision could possibly come from. Does the government have many more people on its payroll than it officially admits, or did it spend many times more on the military than originally thought?
The seven-fold upward revision to inventory investment suggests that this item is a rather meaningless residual in the NBS's calculations. This implies, for example, that the data on inventory change cannot serve as a measure of macroeconomic cycles.
A third approach to the calculation of GDP, beyond the production and the expenditure approaches, is the income approach where GDP equals labour remuneration, net taxes on production, depreciation and the operating surplus. These data have always been published at the provincial level only, and only in nominal form. Retrospectively revised income approach data are not available. , and the share of operating surplus jumps from 0.20 to 0.30. In other words, the NBS has previously overestimated labour remuneration by 25 per cent and underestimated operating surplus by 50 per cent. Because the official value added data for the tertiary sector are mostly derived from income data, the revisions to the income approach data have to square with the upward revision to tertiary sector value added in the production approach 19 ; given that the tertiary sector is relatively labour-intensive, one would expect an increase in tertiary sector value added to go hand in hand with an increase in the economy-wide share of labour remuneration in GDP, rather than with the decrease documented in Figure 2 .
Conclusions
The The 2006 benchmark revision opens a window on how the NBS operates. First, it is either incapable or unwilling to explain properly how the 2006 benchmark revisions were conducted, where the statistical breaks are, when they occur and of what size they are. Second, in recent years the NBS has repeatedly dropped hints of under-reported national tertiary sector value added, which suggests it knowingly reported false GDP data for at least the most recent years. Third, by not revising secondary sector real growth rates, the NBS shows itself incapable of adding up two and two. It appears as if it simply did not want to increase the real growth rates in these two sectors. At that point, the NBS reveals itself as, at best, a political propaganda organ -don't revise GDP growth rates up too much -with scarce, or no regard for the compilation of accurate statistics. ''Cooking the data'' substitutes for logical mathematical operations.
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The size of some of the revisions to expenditure approach data and of the innovations in the case of the income approach data appear very much out of proportion. If the statistics published by NBS are that much off, where the national income and product accounts are at the core of China's statistical data, then what does that mean for related and, perhaps even worse, for unrelated and less ''important'' statistics? Is every one of the thousand pages of the Statistical Yearbook taking us for a ride?
With a solid basis in form of the 2004 economic census, one would expect future data to be more reliable. But reports from the grassroots suggest that the economic census was, at least in some localities, poorly organized, possibly severely under-funded and in several respects not suited to capture the value of economic activities. 21 If the economic census were indeed a complete waste of time and money (unlikely), then the possibility arises that the NBS had good reason to retain its earlier real growth rates in the primary and secondary sector. But that still means that the NBS works with sectoral (and GDP) real growth rates that are inconsistent, fudges statistical breaks, and moves mountains in the expenditure and income approaches. In the end, one may begin to wonder about the possibility and likelihood of professional statistical work in China. For the time being, the 2006 benchmark revision implies that Chinese statistics have to be taken with a rock of salt.
20 Xu Xianchun, ''Changes,'' p. 17, perhaps hints at the reason for avoiding revisions. He explains that the new treatment of financial sector value added has been on the agenda for a long time, but the resulting large change in the value of financial sector value added would have created a statistical break which would have been ''not easy for the relevant departments and society to accept,'' while retrospective revisions of earlier data require a suitable opportunity, ''otherwise everybody disapproves.'' 21 See, among others, Xie Haiqiu and Zhang Lihua, ''Dui shouci jingji pucha ruogan wenti de sikao yu jianyi'' (''Thoughts and suggestions regarding some problems in the first economic census''), Tongji jiaoyu, No. 2 (2006), pp. 11-13, who suggest that in their locality, Hunan province Zhuzhou municipality, GDP may well be 8% higher than the economic census suggests.
